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Africa’s middle class has become a central protagonist in the development 
discourse. Beyond providing hope of economic growth, some analysts see 
it as a bastion of political stability, progress, and democratic consolidation. 
Many recent protests and (partly successful) attempts to overthrow ageing 
statesmen who tried to overstay in power have been connected by the media 
to the rise of an African middle class.
 • After a decade of strong but largely jobless economic growth, the bulk of sub-
Saharan Africa’s new non-poor is still at the crossroads between upward and 
downward mobility. Researchers increasingly agree that the size and economic 
potential of African consumer markets have been exaggerated.
 • Similarly, the link frequently made between the rise of a new African middle 
class and pro-democratic political reforms remains fragile. Rising incomes and 
falling poverty rates cannot easily be equated with the emergence of a politi-
cally conscious middle class that supports democracy and good governance.
 • The economic and political transformative power of African middle classes will 
depend on (a) the development of a shared identity that goes beyond ethnic and 
historical ties, (b) economical detachment from state benefices, (c) increased 
political activism among the better educated, and (d) the alignment of political 
self-interest with the needs of the broader population.
 • Creating jobs and reducing persistent inequalities remain central challenges 
that governments must face in order to prevent the frequently largest group of 
“strugglers” among the middle class from backsliding into poverty.
Policy Implications
Africa’s rising middle class is not a homogeneous actor but a mosaic of differ-
ent groups under a common label. Driven mainly by frustration, there is an in-
creasingly vocal and politically conscious share of young, urban citizens within 
the lower middle class strata. The upper strata, however, are characterised by 
political lethargy and bias towards the status quo, which render the great expec-
tations placed on the middle class’s transformative political power unjustified.
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Africa’s Middle-Class Story: From Shopping Malls to Democracy 
The wave of upbeat stories about Africa’s accelerating economic growth in the years 
after 2000 has been excitedly embraced by the business community, which is seek-
ing new investment opportunities in a global landscape unsettled by financial tur-
bulence and stagnation in Western markets. More than a few management con-
sultancies and fund managers have celebrated the continent as the “new frontier.” 
Multinational companies have ventured into the African market with large invest-
ments, counting on a transition of many African economies from resource exporters 
to consumer markets. Stirred up by an influential report from the African Develop-
ment Bank (Ncube et al. 2011), Africa’s rising middle class has been portrayed as a 
central protagonist in this optimistic narrative. 
However, since the end of the commodity boom, Africa’s new middle class con-
sumers have decreased spending. This has seen critical opinions expressed with the 
same vehemence as those earlier optimistic views. Numerous newspapers articles 
and media reports have jumped on the examples of Nestlé and Barclays, which have 
turned their backs on Africa after disappointing returns on major investments.
Beyond viewing Africa’s new middle class as a prospective engine of economic 
growth (through its potential to shift consumption and production patterns), some 
analysts have fostered the idea that it could also become a bastion of political stability, 
progress, and democratic consolidation across the continent. In line with the uS politi-
cal sociologist Barrington Moore’s famous statement “No bourgeoisie, no democracy,” 
Africa’s middle class voters are expected to promote democratic maturity and good 
governance. Rather than simply occupying a space in the income distribution in so-
ciety, they are seen as – in the words of the African Development Bank’s former chief 
economist, Mthuli Ncube – the “drivers of democracy” throughout the region. This 
expectation rests not only on the fact that educational attainment is now higher in the 
region, but also on the knowledge that increased integration into the global communi-
cation landscape is occurring via use of mobile phones, the Internet, and social media 
networks. The mobile phone, for instance, “is creating a politically conscious class” in 
Africa according to Citigroup’s Africa economist, David Cowan (Fletcher 2013). 
However, an increasing number of analysts caution that the springing up of shop-
ping malls, European-style coffee shops, movie theatres, and new housing complexes 
in a number of African cities should not be equated with the rise of a growing, politi-
cally conscious middle class that is safeguarding democracy and individual rights and 
condemning corruption. While there is now increasing evidence that estimations of 
the size and economic potential of Africa’s new middle class have been exaggerated, 
knowledge on the political values, attitudes, and behaviours of these new „non-poor“ 
is only just beginning to evolve. We are yet to determine whether the African middle 
class shares particular values or whether it can become the harbinger for democratic 
consolidation and gradual political change. In the following we will shed light on these 
questions after clarifying who is actually understood to be middle class in Africa. 
Who Is Africa’s Middle Class?
At the core of the opposing views and expectations of the potential of Africa’s mid-
dle class is a long-standing debate on what constitutes the middle class. As already 
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noted by Aristotle, its members should be somewhere in the middle, which typically 
means they should be neither rich nor poor. However, to derive a comprehensive 
measure of social class, researchers ideally would like to have information on a 
broad range of factors. These may include someone’s family background, education, 
job, and wage earnings as well as whether she lives in a proper house, owns a car, 
has a mobile phone, or even just perceives herself as a member of the middle class. 
Most class analyses draw on the assumption that the accordingly identified social 
positions are somehow linked to shared interests, values, and behaviours. 
To simplify matters and due to a frequent lack of respective data, however, many 
studies reduce class analysis to a monetary indicator that approximates a person’s 
social status. Most commonly used are absolute thresholds that (rather arbitrar-
ily) locate the middle class within a particular income or expenditure range, which 
eases comparisons across countries. Certainly, where one sets these thresholds has 
qualitatively different implications. This has seen a heated debate emerge, especially 
regarding the lower cut-off point that separates the poor from the middle class. Al-
though most experts will agree that (relative) poverty in Africa has fallen over the 
past two decades, the important question here is whether all those who are no  longer 
starving automatically enter the middle class. Some of the dominant definitions in 
fact do suggest so and imply that someone living on the equivalent of USD 1.99 a 
day (mostly measured in purchasing power parities) would still be considered poor, 
while just one additional cent would push the same person into the middle class. 
Most influential with regard to Africa, the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
released a report in 2011 suggesting three subdivisions of the African middle class: 
“floating” (USD 2–4), “lower middle” (USD 4–10), and “upper middle” (USD 10–20). 
According to this definition, almost every third person was considered middle class 
in Africa. other approaches argue that only those people who are at a reasonably low 
risk of falling back into poverty should be counted as middle class and thus advocate 
a higher lower cut-off of that lies between USD 4 and USD 10 and an upper cut-off up 
to USD 100 (Kharas 2010; Birdsall 2015). [1]
using the World Bank’s PovcalNet database, Figure 1 shows that while the size 
of Africa’s middle class looks rather impressive under the AfDB definition, it al-
most vanishes when more demanding criteria are applied. Also sobering is the geo-
graphical dispersion: most of the African upper middle class (those spending above 
USD 10 a day) is based in the North of the continent (10 per cent of the global mid-
dle class versus 2 per cent in the South). [2] This does not bode well for the narrative 
of a new consumption frontier south of the Sahara.
Adding future concerns to this pessimistic present picture, organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predictions suggest that the re-
gion’s share in the global middle class will remain unchangeably negligible up to 
2030 (Kharas 2010). Again based on PovcalNet data, Figure 2 reveals that past 
1 Some researchers have 
also advocated relative 
measures that locate the 
middle class in the ac-
tual middle of the national 
distribution. For example, 
some define the three 
middle-income quintiles as 
middle class, while others 
define it relative to the 
median earner in society.
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trends in the size of the region’s middle class justify the upbeat expectations of a 
future middle-class boom in sub-Saharan Africa only if those who just jumped the 
poverty line are taken into account. 
Apart from the discussion on the mere size and lived economic reality of Africa’s 
lower and upper middle classes, it is important to ask whether these definitions 
actually matter once we look beyond consumption. A number of researchers assume 
they do. For example, Mthuli Ncube suggests that the emerging middle class in 
Africa (USD 2–USD 20) “has the capacity [not only] to increase domestic consump-
tion [but also to] contribute to private sector growth and entrepreneurialism; boost 
demand for better governance and public services; improve gender equality; and 
raise standards of living, allowing many people to exit from poverty” (Ncube and 
Lufumpa 2015: 1). Nancy Birdsall (2015) adopts a somewhat more restrictive per-
spective, viewing the lower middle class (USD 4–USD 10) – the members of which 
do not yet enjoy a similarly comfortable position in life as the secure upper middle 
class – as a political catalyst that can push for greater government accountability 
and good governance. 
However, these studies’ over-reliance on monetary measures of class calls into 
question their expectations of middle-class attitudes. Any absolute or relative mon-
etary threshold can hardly be understood as a strict division of the population into 
clearly distinct social groups. 
Rather, from a sociological perspective, a fabric worker in a leading position 
and a trainee teacher may earn similar salaries but are unlikely to share common 
interests. Thus to ensure a more theoretically sound class analysis, there are studies 
that draw on the sociological literature to develop more complex definitions based 
on the ownership of tangible and intangible assets, employment status, occupation, 
education, or possibilities for upward mobility. 
Hitherto, only few studies exist that take into account such factors and have 
sought to develop a more comprehensive measurement in order to assess the mid-
dle-class in sub-Saharan Africa. These studies have tended to focus on people’s 
consumption capacity and behaviour, or on asset status. Based on an asset-based 
methodology, one study scales down the number of Africans considered middle 
class to 19 million, amounting to 3.3 per cent of the adult population (Credit Suisse 
2015). Another finds that while the middle class is growing in size on average, it is 
at a much slower rate than suggested by most of the income- or expenditure-based 
calculations (Shimeless and Ncube 2015). The study conducted by McEwan et al. 
(2015) is rare in that it employs a multidimensional indicator that differentiates 
consumers into 10 groups according to 29 indicators of living standards in South 
Africa (e.g. asset ownership, race, degree of urbanisation, etc.). Their findings re-
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veal that upper sections of the middle class and the upper class (groups 7 to 10 ac-
cording to their methodology) had grown rapidly in size and covered around 35 per 
cent of the South African adult population in 2011. 
Taking these additional dimensions into consideration can be particularly im-
portant if one wishes to establish a link between class membership and political 
attitudes and behaviours. Following Inglehart’s hierarchy of needs, lower levels of 
economic scarcity and insecurity are necessary conditions for a shift in priorities 
towards higher-order “post-materialist” values such as self-expression, democra-
cy, gender rights, and environmental concerns. For other modernisation thinkers, 
however, income growth by itself is not a sufficient condition; it only matters due to 
its close association with changes in education levels, which shapes social attitudes, 
or because it enables the middle class to act independently of the state. In the fol-
lowing we investigate the extent to which these concepts are prevalent in Africa. 
Political Attitudes and Behaviour of  
Middle-Class Members in Africa
The question that inevitably arises is whether we are actually witnessing the emer-
gence of a new, politically conscious African middle class that upholds civic values 
and democratic attitudes. While the academic evidence is still scare in this regard, 
more than a few media reports suggest that this is the case. Three core aspects have 
been connected to the political behaviour and attitudes of middle classes across dif-
ferent African countries:
Youth-led public protests shielding existing democratic systems
The past year kicked off with a series of upbeat news reports on a wave of protests 
that aimed to shield existing democratic systems from veteran leaders’ attempts to 
cling to power. Commentators attributed these youth-led street-level protests to 
the middle class – including those that resulted in the election of a new president 
in Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, and Benin, as well as those that failed to bring 
about a change in presidency, such as in uganda. This assumption was based on the 
observations that the protests emerged in larger cities and that the spaces where po-
litical debates take place (e.g. pay-television news, talk radio stations, social media, 
and other online platforms) are generally inaccessible to society’s poorest. There is, 
however, insufficient evidence to support the assertion that these events were part 
of a middle-class movement. In most of the countries in question there is not a mid-
dle class large enough to have effected such changeovers in power. If anything, one 
may conclude that there is a frustrated, increasingly vocal, predominantly young, 
urban lower middle class that is interconnecting through social media networks and 
making their voices heard. After a decade of strong but largely jobless economic 
growth, sub-Saharan Africa’s young urban dwellers are at the crossroads between 
upward and downward mobility. Discontent over high unemployment rates and 
persistent inequality, rather than any joint middle-class identity, seems to be the 
driving force behind these protests. 
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Higher levels of education fostering support for  
democracy and civic values
A few recent academic studies have shown that, if defined mainly by higher levels 
of education, the middle class in sub-Saharan Africa is indeed more likely to uphold 
democracy as an ideal, be critical of long-serving African leaders, and prioritise 
higher-order needs than their less-educated peers. For example, according to the 
Afrobarometer opinion poll which asked Kenyans about their voting behaviour at 
the 2013 general election, middle-class Kenyans were found to be much more hesi-
tant to strongly agree that the president should be free to act without constraints 
than their lower-class (less-educated) peers. They are also considerably less likely 
to approve a government’s right to unilaterally ban organisations it dislikes. And 
particularly important for the democratic landscape, while two in three highly edu-
cated Kenyans believe multi-partyism is needed in order to have a real choice in 
who governs them (68 per cent), every second uneducated Kenyan sees political 
parties as divisive or confusing (51 per cent) (Cheeseman 2014). 
With respect to electoral authoritarian regimes, middle-class voter turnout has 
been commonly found to be higher the more competitive an election is perceived 
to be. For example, a study on Zimbabwe based on Afrobarometer data reveals that 
middle-class citizens (mainly defined by higher levels of education) have a higher 
level of political awareness but are less likely to participate politically if they believe 
that their votes are worthless or legitimate autocrats. For instance, better-educated 
citizens cast significantly more votes during the 2008 election, when opposition 
candidate Morgan Tsvangirai put up a credible challenge to incumbent president 
Robert Mugabe, than they did in 2013, when there was no serious opposition (Croke 
et al. 2015). 
However, these findings hardly represent any middle-class particularism;  rather, 
they justify the assumption of the positive and rather monotonic relationship be-
tween education and pro-democratic attitudes also found in other regions around the 
world. Similarly, researchers investigating the role of the middle class in democratic 
consolidation in the case of Zambia highlight that the largest difference in political 
participation, trust, and values is between the rich and the poor at the two extremes 
rather than between the middle class and the rest (Resnick 2015). 
Class affiliation versus cultural and historic ties
Another underestimated aspect is the socio-cultural diversity of the new middle 
class. More than a few analysts believe that the middle class is more likely to vote 
according to actual policy preferences rather than to traditional allegiances to any 
party or ethnic group (e.g. Fletcher 2013). However, ethnicity and other histori-
cally determined loyalties still play important roles when it comes to voting. In fact, 
they frequently convey identity and shape behaviourism in more important ways 
than does class membership. A survey of young middle-class voters in the context 
of Kenya’s 2013 election revealed that “despite initially expressing a preference for 
candidates who stood for better governance and the fight against corruption, they 
ultimately voted for the party led by [incumbent president] Uhuru Kenyatta. As 
members of the Kikuyu ethnic group they worried that voting against Kenyatta’s 
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broad but Kikuyu dominated ethnic coalition would allow a non-Kikuyu to win the 
Presidency” (Bernstein et al. 2014: 3). 
Similar findings have been obtained in the case of South Africa, where racial 
differences within the middle class still dominate inter-class differences in political 
participation and public policy preferences (Mattes 2015). Researchers have spe-
cifically detected a lack of social identity among the middle class, which constrains 
its transformative potential. “If the racial gap in earnings and education is decreas-
ing, but racial differences continue to loom large in the minds of South Africans, the 
growth in the black share of middle-class professions or the black share of income 
may not translate to a more integrated and less polarised social and political land-
scape” (Burger et al. 2015: 38). In the following section we will take a closer look at 
these historic ties in the specific case of South Africa.
The Case of South Africa: The Potential of the Middle Class  
to Take a Critical Stance in Politics
South Africa serves as an especially illustrative case of how the transformative 
power of the middle class may be connected to its relationship with the state. one 
could expect that post-apartheid policy tools like affirmative action, black economic 
empowerment, and state development contracts have drawn upwardly mobile black 
South Africans into a coalition with the ruling party. For example, “a black elite and 
middle class that has found itself in positions of power, privilege and profit is not 
likely to bite the hand of the party-state that feeds it” (Southall 2014). In fact, “The 
more dependent they are upon the ruling party for their welfare, the more they are 
likely to support it” (Ibid.). This situation would rather contradict the assumption 
that Africa’s middle class will become a strong agent of (pro-democratic) political 
change. Similar claims have been made with respect to the middle classes in India 
and Indonesia, for example, who are often characterised as too close to the state to 
actually assert political pressure (Handley 2015).
Nonetheless, recent evidence shows that South Africa’s black middle-class voters 
are actually less likely to identify with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
– which has governed the country since the end of apartheid in 1994 – and more 
likely to vote for the opposition than are other black South Africans. Furthermore, 
black South Africans who enjoy physiological security or have had access to higher 
education are more likely to support higher-order needs of good governance and 
Figure 3. 
Class Support for 
Civil Liberties in 
South Africa, 2012
Source: Authors’ cal-
culations based on South 
African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS) 2012.
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self-expression and less likely to prioritise the provision of basic goods and services 
than are their worse-off peers (Mattes 2015). However, these findings may at least 
be partly driven by a very broad categorisation employed in this study, which lumps 
the middle class in with the elite. 
In the following we use data from the 2012 South African Social Attitudes Sur-
vey (SASAS) to highlight that political attitudes within this broadly defined middle 
class are far from uniform and may depend not only on the present living standard 
but also on expectations of future well-being and perceived life chances. We sug-
gest a multidimensional approach to defining “middle-class” – one that combines 
indicators of household wealth (assets), upward social mobility, and perceived well-
being. This allows us to produce a finer subdivision that differentiates between five 
social classes: (i) the “poor,” who lead the most precarious lives, (ii) “strugglers,” 
who have just escaped poverty, (iii) a “downwardly mobile” middle class, (iv) an 
“upwardly mobile” middle class, and (v) the “elite.” [3] 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the largest difference in average support for civil 
liberties in South Africa is not between the middle class, on the one hand, and the 
lower classes and the elite, on the other, but rather between the elite and the rest. 
The elite shows the strongest opposition to any government authority that allows 
it to prevent citizens from criticising the state or to control the information given 
to the public. The differences between the four non-elite classes are comparatively 
marginal. This raises the question of whether support for good governance is driven 
by the black elite alone and not, as found by Mattes (2015), by the new black middle 
class. At the same time, the elite is least likely to support mass protest as an accept-
able way for people to express their views in a democracy. 
Moreover, when looking at other policy areas, we find little support for the idea 
that the middle class will take a more critical stance in politics. on the contrary, 
better-off households are generally more satisfied with the provision of public in-
frastructure than are the poor, and the more upward mobile they are, the higher 
their satisfaction with the provision of other public services, including education, 
health care, and social grants (see Figure 4a). High satisfaction offers the middle 
class little reason to pressure the state to provide higher-quality public goods and 
services to everyone, especially the poorest. Figure 4b further suggests that particu-
larly those who have climbed the social ladder under the current regime may exhibit 
a status quo bias, prioritising stability and safeguarding attained living standards 
over progress for the wider population (Schotte 2016). 
Whether South Africa’s political landscape is actually changing will be revealed at 
the 2016 municipal elections. Given that large parts of society are deeply frustrated 
with persistently high (racial) inequality, scarce jobs, and limited access to higher 
3 We apply cluster 
analysis to find natural 
groupings in the data,  
such that members of 
the same class are similar 
along all three dimensions. 
The five resulting classes 
are ranked in ascending 
order according to their 
welfare status. The poor 
lack access even to basic 
goods and infrastructure, 
followed by the strugglers 
who are the largest of the 
five groups and, despite 
their much brighter percep-
tion of life, are still closest 
to the poor in key charac-
teristics. The distinction 
between the “downward 
mobile” and the “upward 
mobile” middle-class strata 
rests primarily on their 
respective perceived life 
chances. While the former 
is the most downbeat 
among all five classes and 
expects living conditions to 
deteriorate, the latter has 
the highest aspirations for 
the near future. The “elite,” 
which is the smallest 
group, distinguishes itself 
from the other four classes 
through its luxurious life-
style, manifested mainly in 
their possession of certain 
assets.
Figure 4. 
Class Attitudes in 
South Africa, 2012
Source: Authors’ cal-
culations based on South 
African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS) 2012.
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education, the ANC certainly cannot take for granted the new black middle-class 
constituency it helped to create. However, it would not be the first time that hopes 
for change have been dashed on election day. So far, the ANC has weathered all 
crises and scandals it has faced, performing just as well as it did in past elections 
(Botlhokwane 2016). 
Fact and Fiction of Africa’s New Middle Class:  
Lessons for Policy-Making
After a decade of strong but largely jobless economic growth, the bulk of Africa’s 
new non-poor remain at the crossroads between upward and downward mobility 
and vulnerable to economic shocks. Fighting persistent inequality and expanding 
access to jobs and education are the most important issues that governments in the 
region will need to address to prevent strugglers from falling back into poverty as 
economic conditions deteriorate. 
Despite these considerations, the link between the middle class and political at-
titudes is far from straightforward and depends, not least, on the type of definitions 
used to define “middle class” and its subclasses. Improved living standards and 
higher levels of education have been associated with pro-democratic attitudes and 
behaviour. Although these are not particular to the middle class, and the  largest 
difference in political views is still between the poor and the elite, the growing 
share of people who fall between these two extremes has the potential to become a 
catalyst in Africa’s political landscape and challenge traditional power structures. 
Nevertheless, whether this so-called new middle class will actually engage in ways 
that are politically and economically transformative essentially depends on four 
conditions:
1. There needs to be a collective identity that transcends ethnic and racial divides 
and historic ties. Put differently, middle class Africans must share common in-
terests and have the ability to collectively organise in pursuit of those interests 
(Handley 2015). Social media can play an important role, especially in connect-
ing predominantly young and urban lower middle-class citizens, as youth-led 
street-level protests have shown. However, traditional power structures will 
generally remain in place as long as voting behaviour remains largely domi-
nated by historic allegiances.
2. Support for good governance as an ideal must translate into political action 
for it to have an impact. If higher levels of education decrease political partici-
pation (or increase political apathy), especially in autocratic contexts, there is 
little reason to expect the new middle class to become a central force for demo-
cratic consolidation throughout the region.
3. The transformative power of the middle class rests on its ability and disposition 
to act independently of the state and criticise the government where necessary. 
The more new middle-class members depend upon their respective ruling party 
for their welfare, the less likely they are to turn against it.
4. The interests of the middle class ought to at least be compatible with the needs 
of the broader population. otherwise, there is a risk of politicians losing sight 
of the continuing importance of the fight against persistent poverty in Africa. 
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Meeting all four conditions will be quite demanding and not easily attained in a 
short period of time. As cautioned by Henning Melber, the high expectations placed 
on the middle class in terms of socio-political advancements are like “trusting those 
who row the galley to decide its course. Meanwhile, the captain and his adjuncts 
are navigating from the commanding bridge, not rowing at all” (Melber 2013: 118).
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